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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Protest is a critical political tool for groups without secure access to water resources.  The 
effectiveness of protest is largely dependent on the ability of groups to organize themselves and 
ensure that they are perceived as legitimate entities.  The purpose of this study is to examine the 
ways in which intra-movement groups are organized and how they manage their legitimacy.  The 
case of the Mahanadi River movement in Odisha, India is used to explore questions of identity, 
legitimacy, and representation in a fractured socio-political movement.  Interview and 
observational data collected over a three-month period were coded for themes.  Results show that 
Mahanadi River movement groups were organized factionally and spatially.  Further, Mahanadi 
River movement groups managed their legitimacy using two related mechanisms: selective 
identity deployment and tokenism.  These findings point to a trend in socio-political movements 
in which movement groups that are spatially, socially, and politically closer to centers of power 
tokenize the identities and experiences of their factional counterparts in order to boost their own 
legitimacy.  In doing so, within-movement understandings of legitimacy are re-constructed, 
resulting in the subversion of tokenized groups’ interests.  This process renders protest, a critical 
political tool, useless to those groups who need it most.  This paper concludes by suggesting 
ways in which the findings may be applied to broader socio-political movement contexts. 
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Mitra1 wakes up at 5:30am in her tiny home in Kantilo village.  She collects a small vase 
and walks 80 meters to the bank of the Mahanadi river to collect water for morning tea.  After 
breakfast, Mitra carries her daughter and once again walks 80 meters to bathe in the river.  The 
river is so muddy that she cannot see the bottom, even at the shallowest point.  After bathing, she 
walks to the village store to purchase soap and potatoes and then settles down to prepare bidis 
(thin tobacco cigarettes).  Mitra spends seven hours rolling bidis, inhaling their toxic gases.  She 
will make around 20-30¢ with this batch.   
 
In the mid-afternoon, Mitra’s husband returns home from his street cleaning job.  Like 
most men in the village, he had made a livelihood as a fisherman before the river began to dry 
up.  It wasn’t until he stopped fishing that Mitra was forced to roll bidis.  Soon after, two 
rickshaws drive up the main street and a crowd gathers around.  Four men dressed in white 
kurtas (shirts) step out, introduce themselves as leaders of the ‘Save Mahanadi’ movement, and 
state that they have traveled hundreds of kilometers to teach the villagers how to fight for their 
right to clean water. 
 
The men in white gather in the village meeting space and invite village residents to join 
them in discussing their plans for an upcoming state-wide protest.  Mitra recognizes one of the 
men from a newspaper article a few weeks ago.  Her husband joins several other men as they file 
into the meeting, while Mitra and the other wives chat about the newcomers outside.  
Occasionally they peek into the closed meeting space through the narrow windows and watch the 
group of men.  After an hour, Mitra returns to her home and begins to prepare dinner.  Her 
husband returns soon after, stating that next week, Mitra will join the other ladies in the village 
in a jal satyagraha in Mahanadi river.  She must memorize this chant: Chhatisgarh Sarkar 
Husiaar; Mahanadi Paani Band Kale Chaliba Naahin; Shighra Amaku Paani Dia. Paani Na 
Dele Nian Jaliba (Oh, Government of Chhattisgarh, be careful; It won’t work if you stop the 
water of the Mahanadi; Give water as soon as possible. If you don’t give water, there will be a 
fire of agitation)!
 
 
 
This anecdote is emblematic of the dynamics present in socio-political movements across 
the world.  Several interesting questions arise from this brief story.  For instance, how much 
weight does Mitra’s voice carry in this movement?  What about the voices of the four 
organizers?  Whose interests are ultimately served by the movement outcomes?  Finding the 
answers to these questions requires taking a closer look at the way legitimacy – defined here as 
work which is determined to be morally, socially, and politically valid by the broader community 
– is constructed and understood.   
 
                                                          
1 Names and identifying details have been changed to maintain anonymity. 
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Introduction 
 
Organized water movements are generally a response to ‘water scarcity’.  Political 
ecologists have long asserted that such scarcity is a social construct (Johnston, 2003; Loftus, 
2009; Swyngedouw, 2009) influenced by both biophysical conditions and human relationships 
(e.g. privileged access; see Rodriguez-Labajos & Martinez-Alier, 2015). Yet, restricted access to 
water resources remains a life-threatening reality to some.  In cases of water insecurity, groups 
organize themselves to protest restrictions on water and secure access to this essential resource.  
The act of protest is critically important, especially for subaltern communities who may not have 
any other viable political recourse.  However, the effectiveness of protest as a political tool 
varies widely and is dependent on the ability of groups to represent themselves as legitimate 
entities and – in the case of a large-scale effort including several different groups – ensure that 
their views are reflected in the broader movement.     
 
Large-scale protest movements have become increasingly common around the globe over 
the past several years.  Some suggest that this phenomenon denotes a shift in the way 
communities understand power and organize to pursue their interests (Youngs, 2017).  
Organizing is further complicated by within-movement power imbalances that preclude 
meaningful involvement for certain groups.  The purpose of this study is to explore the ways in 
which people and groups organize themselves when they are unable to secure access to essential 
water resources. 
 
This study is guided by two research questions: (1) how are intra-movement groups 
organized and (2) how do intra-movement groups manage their legitimacy?  The paper is 
organized into four parts.  I begin by reviewing two relevant bodies of literature and identifying 
major knowledge gaps.  Next, I outline the study site and methodology used to address the 
research questions and display results.  I conclude by arguing that intra-movement legitimacy is 
constructed spatially and factionally and discuss the value of these findings within the broader 
context of socio-political movements.    
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Literature Review 
 
Two bodies of literature were examined to understand (a) the ways in which intra-
movement groups are organized and (b) how they manage their legitimacy.  Literature on 
factionalism in socio-political movements identifies causal factors of factionalism and its effects 
at the movement level (i.e. on the trajectory of the movement as a whole).  Work on spatiality of 
power and protest focuses on place-based identity and the spatial-embeddedness of power in the 
context of socio-political movements. Given the pervasive nature of factionalism and spatially-
embedded power relations in protest movement contexts, familiarity with these topics is critical 
to understanding how movements are organized and legitimacy constructed.   
 
Factionalism in socio-political movements 
 
Factionalism is extremely common in social-political movements (Balser, 1997).  The 
term ‘factionalism’ has been understood in various ways, and this study borrows from political 
science definitions of factionalism as within-party groups, more or less organized, based on 
shared identity and purposes (Boucek, 2009).  Literature on socio-political movements – 
including work the U.S. civil rights and nuclear disarmament movements, Communist 
movements in Myanmar and Nepal, and China’s Red Guard movement – identifies factors 
contributing to factionalism and examines the effects of factionalism on movement-level 
legitimacy.  
 
Relevant work highlights factors both internal and external to movements resulting in 
factionalism.  Regarding the former, some scholars have argued that movements exist in a 
“world of natural friends and enemies whose role is dictated by ideology rather than by shifting 
interests (Schwartz, 1994)”.  Thus, factions may form when movement subgroups differ 
ideologically (Schwartz, 2002).  Ideological differences often stem from disagreements over the 
structure or approach of the movement and may devolve into conflict, altering the trajectory of 
the movement (see Fig. 1).  Further, social and political identities create lines of fissure.  Curtis 
and Zurcher (1973) situate movements within ‘multi-organizational fields’ in which stakeholder 
groups unified under a common goal factionalize based on divergent political and social 
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interests.  In the same vein, factions may arise when one or more subgroups feel excluded from 
the ‘inner core’.  Such conflicts often stem from identity related issues (i.e. race or class-based) 
rather than ideological or tactical differences (Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015).   
 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the effect of factionalism on movement trajectory 
 
The emergence of factions occurs not only internally, but also as a result of external 
factors (Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015).  Movement groups often interact with groups from other 
movements, resulting in further factionalism due to the introduction of foreign – and potentially 
threatening – perspectives (Echols, 1989).  The Communist movement in Myanmar (formerly 
Burma) demonstrates the significant roles of colonialism and political shifts in factionalism.  
This movement – concurrent with the Burma independence movement – began with the 
subversion of the communists’ position in the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) 
by the British (Taylor, 1983).  Resulting ideological disputes between leaders of the Burma 
Communist party eventually led to the emergence of factions.  Further, Khadka’s (1995) work on 
the Communist movement in Nepal highlights the influence of international politics – i.e. 
Chinese communism and India’s dismissal of Nepal’s first democratically-elected Congress – on 
factionalism.  Factions are embedded in identity struggles and reflected in geopolitical conflict 
over time (Khadka, 1995).  
 
Some work highlights the interconnectedness of internal and external factors, focusing on 
within-movement challenges posed by national issues (i.e. cultural complexity, social identity, 
political history).  For instance, the Nepali Communist movement splintered along caste lines as 
groups grappled with the role of caste identity in the movement within a historically identity-
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based hierarchical framework.  Specifically, historically exploited lower caste groups felt as 
though the Communist leadership – provided by the two uppermost castes – posed obstacles to 
the movement’s stance against religious or sectarian creeds (Khadka, 1995).  Walder’s (2006) 
work on China’s Red Guard Movement points to the influence of highly consequential individual 
choices made within (a) an ambiguous, ever-shifting political context and (b) complex power 
structures on factionalism.   
 
Discussions of factionalism generally conceptualize group boundary permeability as a 
continuum. Completely open or totally closed access to movement groups is extremely rare 
(Wright, 1997).  Rather, factions tend to operate in between these dichotomous states, allowing 
access to some and systematically restricting access for others (Wright & Taylor, 1998; 
Pettigrew & Martin, 1987).  In cases of extreme group boundary restrictions, tokenism – defined 
by Cloud (1996) as an individual representing a larger group whose difference is politicized to 
meet a given end – may occur.  In the context of socio-political movements, Wright (1997) 
demonstrated the influence of tokenism on intergroup perceptions of legitimacy.   
 
Factionalism affects legitimacy at the movement level.  That is, the presence of factions 
has been shown to either increase or decrease the legitimacy of the movement as a whole.  For 
instance, the presence of factions may increase the legitimacy of the movement by expanding the 
network of supporters through factional mobilization.  Factions can draw upon their diverse 
support bases to rally support for the broader cause.  On the other hand, infighting among 
factions may undermine the legitimacy of the movement by communicating to supporters that 
the organization is conflicted and thus not worth supporting (Benford, 1993).  Per Polletta and 
Kritschmer (2015), legitimacy is perceived and understood based on signals from outside the 
group.  For instance, media misrepresentation and reporter bias toward movement infighting may 
affect the movement’s portrayal as a legitimate political actor (Rohlinger, 2006).  Further, access 
to politically and socially-powerful groups (e.g. funders, legal support, politicians) can be an 
indicator of legitimacy among movement factions (Bevington, 2009).  Interactions with such 
‘elite’ entities shape group stances, affecting the trajectory of the movement.  Specifically, 
groups with access to the ‘elite’ tend to take on moderate stances for fear of alienating their 
connections.   
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Existing work on factionalism in socio-political movement contexts focuses largely on 
political history, causal factors, and the impacts of factionalism on movement-level legitimacy.  
This work lays a strong foundation for this study, which highlights the complex process of 
legitimacy construction within a socio-political movement.  Because the causal factors of 
factionalism are often place-based, factional dynamics are further complicated by the spatial-
embeddedness of identity and power in protest movements. 
 
Spatiality of power and protest 
 
To fully understand the ways in which intra-movement groups are organized, it is critical 
to examine the ways in which protest movements are embedded in space (Jansen, 2001).  
Literature on the spatiality of power and protest focuses on (1) place-based identity and (2) the 
spatial-embeddedness of power.  Protest movements do not exist in socio-political vacuums, and 
spatially-embedded power relations play a significant role in the organization of movement 
groups (Koopmans, 2004).  
 
Regarding the former, Larsen (2008) conceptualizes place as a political tool which can be 
used to either navigate or exploit differences to a given end.  Specifically, Larsen uses the case of 
northern British Columbia to illustrate the politicization of ‘place’ by movement leaders as a 
means of constructing collective identity against external threats (Larsen, 2003).  Constructed 
collective identity is manifested in instances of otherwise-unrelated social groups banding 
together to resist action by an external group.  Larsen provides the example of local communities 
and environmentalists using the idea of ‘place’ to work across ideological differences and create 
a common front against a shared external threat (i.e. hydroelectric dam developers).  The 
coalition successfully pushed the anti-dam movement forward, but was ultimately disbanded 
when the shared threat disappeared, value differences resurfaced, and conflict ensued (Larsen, 
2008).   
 
Woods (2003) expands on this idea by highlighting the intersectional nature of place-
based politics.  Boundaries between social movements are impossible to determine, thus groups 
with multiple salient sub-identities may be positioned within the scope of multiple social 
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movements (e.g. black farmers’ organizations in the U.S.).  Movement trajectories are shaped by 
the aspects of culture and lifestyle deemed essential to these place-based, intersectional sub-
identities (Woods, 2003).  However, intra-movement power imbalances reshape movement-level 
trajectories (see Fig. 1), as demonstrated by Woods’ example of the concurrent rise of U.S. 
capitalist agriculture and internal-external political divisions in the 1920’s.  Soon after, rural 
interests began to be externally represented by nationally-recognized ‘elite’ groups, whose self-
serving actions reshaped the rural landscape.   
 
Regarding the spatiality of urban movements, Jansen (2001) uses the case of the Serbian 
anti-Milosevic movement to demonstrate how protests are embedded in urban space.  
Specifically, Jansen notes the concentration of dominant political institutions in urban space, and 
how the physical exclusion of demonstrators resulted in transgressions of spatial-political 
boundaries via the “symbolic re-claiming of space”.   For instance, when protesters were not 
allowed to enter the regime’s buildings, they would move to places laden with symbolic meaning 
such as the Milosevic-controlled media buildings (Jansen, 2001).    
 
Enhanced understanding of the spatiality of protest movements requires familiarity with 
the concept of power.  Power can be understood as something that exists in one or more 
modalities (e.g. authority, manipulation) which, in turn, have distinct spatialities (Allen, 2003).  
Several authors highlight the spatial-embeddedness of power (Melucci, 1989; Routledge, 1993, 
1996; Sharp et al., 2000), emphasizing the inability of humans to detach themselves from ever-
present power relations.  Bridging ideas of factionalism and the spatiality of protest, Corbridge 
(1992) highlights the prevalence of localized, place-specific factions in contemporary social 
movements. Subasic et al. (2008) explores the ways in which groups with high status interact 
with low-status groups.  The authors assert that whereas low-status groups typically challenge 
the authority of high-status groups, high-status group members may act in political solidarity 
with low-status groups in ways that embody relevant norms and values. 
 
Cohen (1996) highlights Alain Touraine’s identity-orientated theory, which aims to 
explain how groups (i.e. ‘collective actors’) construct their identities and navigate complex 
systems of political legitimacy.  Routledge (1996) introduces the idea of ‘terrains of resistance’ 
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to refer to “sites of contestation and the multiplicity of relations between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic powers and discourses.”  Within this framework, ideological, political, and cultural 
expressions imbue space with meaning, creating both the physical and representational space 
within which a conflict takes place. 
 
Existing literature provides a thorough understanding of how legitimacy is constructed 
and understood at the movement level.  However, understanding the complex dynamics of socio-
political movements requires moving beyond movement-level analyses of legitimacy 
construction.  Using the case of the Mahanadi River movement in Odisha, India, this study 
applies relevant ideas from literature on factionalism in socio-political movements and the 
spatiality of power and protest to investigate intra-movement construction and perceptions of 
legitimacy. 
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Study Site 
 
In India, there has been a proliferation of organized environmental movements over the 
past few decades (Swain, 1997).  These movements span a broad range of environmental issues 
from government exploitation of forest resources to dam-related displacement and seem to 
involve people across all social strata.  A popular subset of environmental movements in India 
has been related to the protection of – and access to – river resources.  Several movements linked 
to major Indian rivers have emerged, most notably Narmada Bachao Andolan (‘Save Narmada 
Movement’; NBA) in the early 1990’s.  NBA leaders rallied farmers, environmentalists, and 
Adivasis (an indigenous group) to participate in hunger strikes and peaceful marches to halt 
construction of a large dam project: the Sardar Sarovar dam (Gadgil and Guha, 1994).  The 
movement was ultimately unsuccessful, as the Supreme Court decided in 2000 that dam 
construction would continue without delay, albeit with additional considerations regarding 
environmental impacts and displaced communities (John, 2001). However, NBA has remained 
an emblem of a ‘peoples’ movement’, and several river movements (e.g. Yamuna Bachao 
Andolan, People Against Polavaram Project [PAPP]) have imitated NBA’s approach with 
varying degrees of success.  The most recent of such movements is the Mahanadi River 
movement in Odisha, India. 
 
The Mahanadi River movement in Odisha, India provides a rich context in which to 
investigate (1) how intra-movement groups are organized and (2) how intra-movement groups 
manage their legitimacy.  Odisha state itself has a long, rich history of water conflict and related 
protest movements.  Over the past few years, the Mahanadi River movement has become heavily 
politicized and factionalized.  Odia identity varies widely across the state and is closely tied with 
geography and space.  Odisha’s distinct spatiality and acute power imbalances are deeply 
embedded in the Mahanadi River movement’s structure and organization.  These factors render 
the Mahanadi River movement a rich case study for intra-movement legitimacy construction.   
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The geographic context 
 
Odisha, India (see Fig. 2) is an eastern Indian 
state situated between the Bay of Bengal and the states 
of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, and 
Chhattisgarh.  The Mahanadi river – translated from 
Sanskrit words ‘maha’ (Great) and ‘nadi’ (river) – 
originates in Chhattisgarh state and flows over 850 
kilometers through Odisha before draining into the Bay 
of Bengal.  It is the sixth largest river system in India 
(Behera, 2008).  Mahanadi river flows directly through 
15 of Odisha’s 30 districts and is commonly referred 
to as the ‘Sorrow of Odisha’ due to its long history of 
devastating floods.  Particularly severe floods occurred in 2003, 2008, 2011, and 2013 (Beura, 
2015), causing deaths and severe property damage (Mohanty et al., 2008).  The state has a 
tropical climate with medium to high rainfall, though actual rainfall varies by district (Panda, 
2017). Given the state’s water resources and proximity to the Bay of Bengal, it has become a 
major destination for industrial activity (Mishra & Maitra, 2006; Nayak, 2007).   
 
Odisha’s major cities (Bhubaneswar, Cuttack, Puri, and Berhampur) are concentrated in 
coastal districts.  Urbanization in inland districts has been slower, though one of Odisha’s oldest 
cities – Sambalpur – is in the western part of the state.  Sambalpur is the residential hub for the 
rapidly industrializing district in which it is located (Panda et al., 2016).   
 
The socio-political context 
 
The state capital, Bhubaneswar, is home to the Odisha Legislative Assembly, Secretariat, 
and state government administrative units. Another coastal city, Cuttack, houses the Odisha High 
Court.  These decision-making, regulatory, and judicial bodies are responsible for creating, 
implementing, and enforcing state-wide water policy.  Members of the Legislative Assembly are 
Figure 2. Map of India with Odisha state highlighted in 
pink. Adapted from www.mapsofindia.com  
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elected every five years; the last election occurred in 2014.  Odia politicians and bureaucrats are 
commonly accused of being self-serving and non-transparent. 
 
Odisha’s most prevalent livelihood activities include agriculture, livestock rearing, and 
collecting non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (Lakerveld et al., 2015).  Agriculture is by far the 
largest sector of the Odisha economy, providing employment to more than 70% of the Odia 
population (Paltasingh & Goyari, 2013).  Odisha’s two major crops, rice and maize, are 
extremely water-intensive (Das, 2012).  Agricultural productivity varies by district and over 
time, however farming livelihoods are generally associated with western Odisha. 
 
Approximately 47% of Odisha’s population is below the poverty line (Ghosh et al., 
2012).  The Odia government, overseeing a mineral-rich and water-rich state which provides raw 
materials to the national market, has legitimized extraction-based industrialization by 
perpetuating a development-based narrative (Kumar, 2014).  As such, Odia communities have 
shouldered the costs associated with resource exploitation without receiving any benefits.  As 
victims of the ‘resource curse’ (Le Billon, 2005), many Odia communities have organized 
themselves to demand their right to access Odisha’s natural resources. 
 
History of the Mahanadi River movement 
 
In 1946, the Odisha government announced plans to construct a dam near Hirakud 
township on the Mahanadi river in order to decrease the detrimental effects of flooding on the 
state economy.  The first notice for acquisition of land spanning 95 villages in 1946 was met by 
immediate organized resistance (referred to locally as ‘agitation’) by river-dependent inland 
communities.  The overwhelming sentiment of agitators was antagonism towards coastal 
communities who would reap benefits from the dam without shouldering any of the costs borne 
by the inland communities (Nayak, 2010).  However, resistance was politically weak and became 
quickly overshadowed by the then-pervasive rhetoric of national building.   
 
Hirakud dam construction was inaugurated in 1948 and completed in 1957.  Throughout 
the construction process, around 280 villages were submerged, and residents forced to relocate 
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(Baboo, 1991).  Agitation continued after project completion, and the primary focus shifted from 
dam construction to (a) inadequate relocation compensation and (b) diversion of reservoir water 
from agriculture to industry.  It was during this time that organized agitation groups such as 
Paschim Odisha Krushak Samanwayan Samiti (‘Western Odisha Farmers Coordination 
Committee’) emerged in inland Odisha.  Drawing from Gandhian satyagraha – a technique of 
nonviolent political movement (Rai, 2000) – these groups employed various protest tactics such 
as peaceful marches and sit-ins (Baboo, 2009).  Such demonstrations often led to conflict 
between agitators and Odisha state authorities, typically resulting in arrests of protest leaders by 
police officers (Nayak, 2010).  Groups continued to demand fair compensation for displaced 
communities through the 2000’s, with reports claiming that 10,000 out of 26,561 families had 
still not received compensation in 2014 (Nayak, 2010). 
 
More recently, a dispute over Mahanadi river between Chhattisgarh and Odisha has 
caused a proliferations of protest events across Odisha state.  In 2016, the Odisha government 
accused Chhattisgarh of illegally constructing small dam projects upstream, restricting river flow 
and causing water scarcity for downstream Odia communities.  The groups involved in this 
conflict represent a cross-section of Odia society and include both long-standing water activist 
groups such as Paschim Odisha and newcomers.  One notable new group is Mahanadi Bachao 
Andolan (MBA).  This group, led by a small subgroup of male politicians from Bhubaneswar, 
has been covered extensively by Odia media and utilizes anti-Chhattisgarh rhetoric to rally 
support.  All groups claim to be advancing the movement’s goal of ‘saving Mahanadi river’ from 
water scarcity and use similar protest tactics – most commonly, jal satyagraha: the act of 
immersing one’s body waist-deep into water in protest.  However, the heavily-politicized nature 
of the current conflict has brought deep-seated antagonism and distrust to the fore and claims of 
legitimacy (or lack thereof) have been utilized within the movement to the benefit of some 
factions and the detriment of others.  I used several methods to explore how such claims of 
legitimacy are constructed and understood in the context of the Mahanadi River movement.   
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Methods 
 
Data collection 
 
I collected data over a three month-long field work trip with the help of a local research 
assistant.  I hired the research assistant upon arrival to the field site and ensured that the assistant 
was fluent in Odia language, could understand a handful of Odia dialects, and could effectively 
translate between Odia and English.  Though I am also fluent in Odia, hiring a local research 
assistant was critically important (a) to compare understandings of phrases spoken in dialect, (b) 
validate translations of interview data, and (c) navigate complex relational dynamics in certain 
areas of the field site. 
 
In order to explore (1) how intra-movement 
groups are organized and (2) how intra-movement 
groups manage their legitimacy, I used a combination 
of key informant interviews, focus groups, traveling 
observations, and meeting observations (see Fig. 3).  
Data were collected using the snowball sampling 
method in seven districts – Jharsuguda, Bargarh, 
Sambalpur, Angul, Nayagarh, Cuttack, and Khordha 
(see Fig. 4) – situated along the Mahanadi river, 
running eastward from inland to coastal communities.  
Districts were chosen either because they were sites of major Mahanadi River movement events 
or because the sampling method required travel to another district.  Interviewees are relatively 
evenly distributed across occupation, gender, and space (see Table 1).  This cross-cutting sample 
allows for a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the complex role of identity and spatiality in 
legitimacy construction.   
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of three types of data 
collected 
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Figure 4. Map of Odisha state highlighting the districts in which data were collected (red). Adapted from www.mapsofindia.com.  
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of interviewees across identity and space 
Forty-four key informant interviews were conducted, averaging 1.25 hours each and 
covering several topics including social and group identity, utilitarian and sociocultural values 
associated with the river, engagement in the river movement, and perceptions of major protest 
groups.  Majority of respondents were men (n=32; see Table 1), due in part to the fact that 
movement leadership is predominantly male.  Only two of the women interviewed identified 
themselves as leaders of a group.  
 
Interviews conducted in urban areas were typically one-on-one meetings in a comfortable 
(i.e. air conditioned, chairs) setting.  Thus, there were relatively few distractions or breaks.  In 
15 
 
rural settings (i.e. villages), most interviews took place outdoors, in common meeting areas or in 
front of a respondent’s home.  Some rural meetings shifted between individual interviews and 
focus groups (see Fig. 3), as additional community members would join in and leave throughout 
the process.  In such cases, transcripts differentiated the additional interviewees from the primary 
respondent.  Further, given the extreme heat, many rural interviews were filled with short breaks 
as respondents left to replenish their water.  Finally, interview data varied by gender.  The 
differences were particularly salient in rural settings.  Whereas men were able to freely respond 
to interview questions, many women chose to be accompanied by a male counterpart.  In some 
cases, when women were unable to respond to a question, the man would interject.  This 
dynamic undoubtedly affected the integrity of the data collected and was accounted for in the 
analysis.   
 
Observations made during travel were recorded in a field notebook and used during the 
analysis to provide context and corroborate findings.  For instance, power imbalances between 
interviewees that were never articulated but nonetheless important were included in the field 
notebook to ensure that such nuances were accurately reflected in data analysis. Observational 
data were also collected from movement organizing meetings in both urban and rural settings.  
Meetings were attended by invitation only and restricted to observation (i.e. no participation).  
The meetings averaged 1.5 hours each and notes were taken in a field notebook.  Notes focused 
on communication, power dynamics, logistics and the planning process, and perceptions of 
outgroups.  Like interviews, the type of observational data collected varied by setting.  Meetings 
observed in urban settings were often attended by journalists and photographers, whereas 
meetings in rural settings did not attract as much media attention.  As a result, urban meetings 
tended to take on ‘press conference’ formats as opposed to the group dialogue format seen in 
rural settings. 
 
Data analysis 
 
Majority of key informant interviews and focus groups were voice recorded and 
immediately transcribed.  Interviews conducted in Odia, an Odia dialect, or a combination of 
English and Odia were transcribed and cross-checked by the research assistant for accuracy.  
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Two interviewees did not consent to voice recording requests, and inflated notes were used in 
lieu of a verbatim script.  An initial set of key themes was identified based on field observations. 
Key themes shifted and sub-themes emerged through the process of coding transcripts and 
inflated notes (see Table 2).   
 
 
Table 2. Themes and Sub-theme(s) used during data analysis 
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Results 
 
This section is organized into four parts.  I begin by demonstrating the two ways in which 
Mahanadi River movement groups are organized.  First, I highlight evidence of factionalism 
within the movement and characterize the three major factions.  Next, I provide evidence of the 
salience of place-based identity and spatially-embedded essentialism in intra-movement 
organizing.  Regarding the ways in which Mahanadi River movement groups manage their 
legitimacy, I highlight two mechanisms.  I start by outlining the process of selective identity 
deployment within the movement.  I conclude this section by highlighting assertions of tokenism 
within the Mahanadi River movement. 
 
The organization of intra-movement groups 
 
How are intra-movement groups organized?  Based on data collected in the field, 
Mahanadi River movement groups are organized in two predominant ways: factionally and 
spatially. 
 
i.  Factionalism in the Mahanadi River movement 
 
Supporters of the Mahanadi river movement are united in their vision of saving the river.  
Over the past few years, the movement has split into several factions, each with different 
ideologies and approaches.  As the Mahanadi conflict began to be politicized, three major 
factions emerged: Paschim Odisha, Water Initiatives Odisha (WIO), and Mahanadi Bachao 
Andolan (MBA) (see Fig. 5).  One environmental NGO employee from a coastal district 
described factionalism within the Mahanadi River movement as follows: 
 
“Sometimes there are turf wars among the civil society groups also. And I have seen this much more 
seriously in Odisha. I have been working in Maharashtra and things - but lot of people are working on 
water issues, but there are lot of ego issues here. It’s not a difference in perspective or other type of thing, 
but who takes the lead, where are you located?  There are mutual suspicions. So because of that, there are 
conflicts and fractured type of thing among civil society.” 
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As demonstrated in Figure 5, these groups vary by primary concerns, stated and 
perceived motivations, geographic concentration, and legitimacy (or lack thereof) afforded by 
other factions.  The characterizations outlined in this figure are based on observational data and 
interviewee perceptions of Mahanadi River movement groups. 
 
 
Figure 5. The primary concern(s), location, stated and perceived motivations, and legitimacy of three major factions in the 
Mahanadi River movement 
Differences in magnitude of livelihood stakes associated with the Mahanadi River 
movement have contributed to factionalism.  Paschim Odisha consists mainly of inland farming 
and fishing communities whose livelihoods are based – directly or indirectly – on the Mahanadi 
river.  As such, these communities have extraordinarily high stakes in the outcome of any 
decision regarding the river.  Several interviewees spoke about the high livelihood stakes of the 
communities represented by Paschim Odisha: 
 
“The condition of our fishermen is very critical due to the dried river. It so happened in the summer 
season that we did not get even a handful of water to drink! We did not get drinking water. The depth of 
our well is 33 feet. It dried up. We did not get water from the well. There are no fish in the river. Our 
livelihood is only to catch fish. Due to the scarcity of fish, our community brothers lost their livelihood. 
In order to manage their families, they are going to Gujrat, Surat, Kerala and even to Tamil Nadu. We 
pray that if the Central Government as well as the Government of Odisha gives any encouragement or 
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help to our fishermen community then they will stay near their residences, otherwise they will leave the 
place with the whole family.”  
-Village president, inland district 
 
“There are thousands of fishermen, those who are dependent on Mahanadi, they have lost their livelihood. 
And now the time has come the government must come up with alternative livelihood for them. These are 
the things that needs to be done for the protection of the river and the people who are dependent on it.” 
-Mahanadi Bachao Andolan leader, coastal district 
 
 
Paschim Odisha also has a long history of political engagement and activism in the area, 
specifically regarding allocation of Mahanadi river resources and involuntary displacement of 
village communities following the construction of the Hirakud dam.  Several interviewees spoke 
about the Hirakud dam protests organized by Paschim Odisha with reverence: 
 
“Hirakud conflict came to picture by some farmer groups who were earlier demanding fair price. So there 
were group existing… in Odisha, there are groups [Paschim Odisha] these people have worked around 
land and social movements.  Odisha has a history of social movements around land. Odisha has a history 
of environmental movement kind of thing around forest rights. So these groups find it easy to connect to 
the water rights space.” 
-NGO Employee, coastal district 
 
“30,000 people. Then, they marched for 5 kilometres – from Jagannath temple to Jawahar Minnar. That 
was a historical mass. 30,000 means… The biggest thing was that people came but how to control them? 
They had set up barricades. Who? The district administration, police.” 
-Paschim Odisha leader, inland district 
 
MBA has emerged over the past few years following the announcement of upstream dam 
construction by Chhattisgarh.  This group consists primarily of politicians and bureaucrats.  
MBA’s day-to-day operations (i.e. planning meetings, press conferences) occur in the coastal 
city of Bhubaneswar.  Exceptions include occasional visits to inland communities to coordinate 
protest events.  Given the concentration of agricultural and fishing activity in the west part of the 
state, MBA’s work is relatively detached from the high livelihood stakes associated with groups 
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like Paschim Odisha.  Notably, there is a large discrepancy between MBA’s stated and externally 
perceived motivations (see Fig. 6).   
 
Figure 6. Stated versus perceived motivations of Mahanadi Bachao Andolan 
MBA leaders are staunch in their assertions that their interest in the Mahanadi River 
movement is ‘apolitical’, as shown in the quotes below: 
 
“When people come into politics, they are thinking that ‘I will extract something else’. So, that’s why 
when I joined this I saw that there are so many this type of people were there. So we started the activism 
work. Politics is the secondary part, then I started the activism work. So we help people, help the 
communities, help the villagers” 
-Mahanadi Bachao Andolan leader, coastal district 
 
“This is a movement called ‘apolitical’. Not political movement has been started. So everybody they are 
supporting. Even government to some extent supported us, so there is no affair... We are in a simple 
way.” 
-Mahanadi Bachao Andolan leader, coastal district 
 
“[MBA] wants to tell people that we are only being pressurized by civil society, we are not acting on our 
own. The civil society is pressuring us to act this way. So they want some civil society to toe their line of 
thinking.” 
-Writer, inland district 
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However, other factions and most of general society maintain that MBA is a politically-
sponsored group that lacks genuine concern for the river-dependent communities that it claims to 
be protesting for: 
 
“Actually, political people have taken their – this movement in their way… Neither government, neither 
the political people, they are responsible for usage of the Mahanadi. They are responsible for usage of 
water to industries.” 
-Paschim Odisha leader, inland district 
 
“The elitist groups, who are always nearer to the power, they would always try to please the government. 
So in Odisha, some of these new – to be specific this Mahanadi Andolan – my observation about this 
group is that they are a government-sponsored group.  So what happens is the government cannot make, 
go to the public by making everything political.  So it has to find a scapegoat which does the job for it.” 
-Water Initiatives Odisha leader, coastal district 
 
 
Meanwhile, WIO is a research and advocacy organization whose interest in the Mahanadi 
River began several decades ago, at the height of the Hirakud dam controversy.  In light of the 
recent politicization of the Mahanadi River movement, WIO has expanded its network of writers, 
scientist, and NGOs and published pieces urging a shift in focus from politicized conflict to 
‘apolitical’ concerns such as ecology and sustainability:    
 
“They are non-political groups… This group actually wants to involve people from both Odisha and 
Chhattisgarh for a solution which makes the river sustainable, which protects the river.  Their theory is 
it’s not Odisha versus Chhattisgarh.  Their theory is life of a river is at stake, there has to be a combined 
strategy among all stakeholders so that the river lives long, and if the river survives then only you can use 
the river.” 
-Times of India reporter, coastal district  
 
“But our fight is for the river, for the entire civilization. What we say is river is not your part or their part. 
Ok, geographically you have divided, but then the river is not divided, it doesn’t have a boundary. It’s a 
complete river basin. And you have to work in you know harmony, you have to work in integrated 
approach, you have to actually care for the river.” 
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-Water Initiatives Odisha leader, coastal district 
 
“An… issue is the whole question of environmental flow nobody talks about. And water pollution… We 
did some preliminary research on water quality issues and we found extremely, you know even presence 
of heavy metals and other type of things as a, you know water sample we got tested and things. So some 
of the substantive issues are not coming into the debate or discourse around this whole conflict.” 
-NGO Employee, coastal district 
 
 
ii.  Spatiality in the Mahanadi River movement 
 
Mahanadi River movement groups are also organized spatially.  The social and political 
fabric of Odisha state varies widely by space.  Different parts of Odisha state have taken on 
different identities.  Differences are most salient along the ‘upstream-downstream’ and ‘inland-
coastal’ divide (see Fig. 7).  These two classifications were used by interviewees to describe the 
same collections of communities.   
 
Figure 7. Place-based identities of Mahanadi River movement factions 
 
Generally, poor, river-dependent ‘upstream’ or ‘inland’ communities are perceived to be 
victims of exploitation by ‘downstream’ or ‘coastal’ actors, as demonstrated by the following 
excerpts: 
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“Maximum revenue is being collected from this part; and the revenue are invested in the coastal belt. So 
the enmity between the western part and eastern part is old, age-old war.” 
-Paschim Odisha member, inland district 
 
“The conflict that is going on between Chhattisgarh and Odisha, innocent people become the victim of it. 
Do you get it? If we had restricted for them this water 18 years ago… had they restricted since the day 
they started the [dam] project, crores of rupees would not have been spent from the Treasury of the 
Government of Odisha. That money is spent from the pockets of the poor people. The innocent people are 
facing great trouble!” 
-Journalist, inland district 
 
“In Odisha, we have two distinct parts: one is coastal and one is western part… There is always a 
comparison between western and coastal. There is a coastal-western feeling also.  So people of western 
Odisha feel that they [coastal] are getting most of the benefits, whereas we [inland] have the resources.” 
-Writer, inland district 
 
Some attribute the exploitative nature of the inland-coastal relationship to the elitist 
disinterest of coastal groups and essential simplicity and vulnerability of inland communities, as 
demonstrated by the quotes below: 
 
“There is much exploitation. Cuttack, Bhubaneswar, Jagatsinghpur, Jajpur – all coastal belts. Technically 
our people are very simple people and straightforward people. They [coastal] are a little bit brainy 
people.” 
-Paschim Odisha leader, inland district 
 
“….and what they do – they slowly acquire land very cheap rate and become landlords. This happens. 
And due to innocent nature of people of this area, they easily get swayed away by their sweet talks.”  
-Paschim Odisha member, inland district 
 
Other interviewees discussed how place-based identities are embodied by Mahanadi 
River movement groups.  As described earlier, Paschim Odisha has a long history of activism in 
inland communities.  Its current work is still concentrated in these communities, and as such, the 
group itself is often seen as vulnerable to exploitation by its coastal counterparts.  On the other 
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hand, while MBA claims to represent the interests of Odia society at large, its operations are 
typically concentrated in coastal cities.  Notions of coastal elitist disinterest, exploitation, and 
duplicity are attached to this movement group.  For instance, one NGO employee from an inland 
district described their perception of MBA’s motivations:  
 
“I think [MBA] has own agenda to be part of this game. So now it has become a, see this has become a 
political thing. So if I make a fight, I make a agenda, I might get a political ticket for this next election 
which is coming in next to next year. So everybody has their own personal agenda… Really sad.” 
 
As demonstrated, power imbalances are latent in the factional and spatial organization of 
the Mahanadi River movement.  The next sub-section highlights the ways in which groups 
leverage parts of their identities and navigate spatially-embedded power relations to maintain 
their own legitimacy. 
 
Legitimacy management among intra-movement groups 
 
How do intra-movement groups construct and manage their legitimacy?  In the context of 
the Mahanadi River movement, groups construct and manage legitimacy using two mechanisms: 
selective identity deployment and tokenism. 
 
i.  Selective identity deployment by Mahanadi River movement groups 
 
Movements are embedded in – among several other factors – shared social identity 
(Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015).  In the case of the Mahanadi River movement, groups contain 
several intersectional social identities (i.e. geographic location, political clout, resources, history 
of activism; see Fig. 5).  In the context of water activism, some identities are more legitimizing 
than others.  Groups tended to emphasize only those identities which enhanced their legitimacy.  
This was demonstrated through interviewees’ statements about their groups’ motivations (see 
Fig. 8).   
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Figure 8. Stated motivations of Mahanadi River movement groups 
 
For instance, members of Paschim Odisha typically emphasized the livelihood stakes of 
its constituents and the group’s long history of engagement in Mahanadi River activism.  This 
combination of identities has cast Paschim Odisha as a highly legitimate movement group, as 
demonstrated in the following excerpt from a Paschim Odisha leader in an inland district:  
 
“In 2005 when we came to know that water from this river would be diverted to various industries around 
the [Hirakud] dam, we started studying about its implication. And since it was a dam that was constructed 
five decades ago – 1957 it was completed - from our own experiences, experience of farmers, we had a 
very clear apprehension that the agricultural community who gave water for irrigation, fishing community 
who fish from the dam, they will be affected.” 
 
Members of WIO tended to emphasize the group’s dedication to ‘objective’ science and 
facts.  Further, the group has taken care to position itself as a ‘neutral’ voice in the increasingly 
contentious and highly-politicized conflict.  As such, WIO is deemed highly legitimate as well:  
 
“Though we invite [MBA] to our platform, we have been a little more careful in how far we associate and 
to what level that association is seen… In the case of some of the positions which [MBA] has taken, it is 
very pro-Odisha state. There was an internal reflection saying that if we do a study for – on behalf of one 
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state, the forum’s credibility with the other state will go down. So that’s a problem.  This whole area is a 
bit of a very messy arena. So as a larger network we need to be rather clear with whom, to what extent we 
associate in things… we don’t want to seem completely aligned with Mahanadi Bachao Andolan” 
-NGO Employee, coastal district 
 
“[WIO] has been trying to create awareness about river, the dying nature of river. They’re the group – at 
least they have got a bigger picture understanding. There has to be some scientific understanding of the 
whole thing has to be there. It’s not rocket science.” 
-NGO Employee, coastal district 
 
Finally, MBA focused its discussions of motivation on its concern for Odia society’s 
well-being.  As such, it has framed its role in the conflict as a group ‘for the people’ despite its 
new group status and relative detachment from livelihood stakes.  By taking steps to ensure that 
inland communities participate in their protest events, MBA claims to be not only a group ‘for 
the people’, but also a group ‘by the people’.  However, several interviewees highlighted the 
detached, duplicitous, and exclusive nature of MBA’s work.  The seemingly disingenuous nature 
of MBA’s work (see Fig. 6) – combined with widespread perceptions of coastal ‘elitism’ – have 
given this group very little legitimacy:  
 
“[This conflict] is a fight between the governments. It’s a fight between the political parties. Actually 
there are nowhere the real people in those fights. Whatever they say that they are doing these Andolans - 
road blockage whatever - it is the same you know, for the same issues. It’s not for the real people’s 
issues.” 
-Water Initiatives Odisha leader, coastal district 
 
“The meeting was held; I heard them; and we were not given any chance to speak. The meeting was held. 
The leaders of [MBA] delivered speeches. The general people did not get chance to say anything. The 
public has not been given chance to say something; whatever they would speak from the stage, we would 
listen to that.”  
-Village resident, inland district 
 
“Everybody is crying for the Mahanadi. But not a drop of tear in anyone’s eyes!” 
-Paschim Odisha leader, inland district  
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“Honestly speaking, I don’t know how serious is Odisha politicians, but they are not serious about water, 
Mahanadi… Now [MBA] is trying to use Mahanadi as a political, you know, reason to get more votes.  
And when they do so, what happens no, like – so even if they are serious, it requires understanding a 
river, requires a kind of very nuanced understanding.  We started reading the river about hydrological 
integrity.  Very technical thing.  But when you start reading and understanding sociocultural, hydrological 
complexities, our understanding is more nuanced.  And even still it is not very complete. So that requires 
patience, that requires you know, understanding. But what happens when political masters frame a 
strategy which is implemented or mass mobilized by their grassroot workers?” 
-NGO Employee, coastal district 
 
Groups like MBA lack legitimizing identities and must find alternate ways to boost their 
status within the movement.  Rather than rely on those few identities which do produce 
legitimacy, they tend to draw from the identities and experiences of other groups.   
 
ii. Tokenism in the Mahanadi River movement  
 
Tokenism was used by Mahanadi River movement groups to boost their legitimacy.  This 
was particularly true for MBA, given its low legitimacy status among other movement groups.  
MBA has allegedly drawn tokens from inland communities:  
 
“Either any person or any group has made themselves involved in the Mahanadi movement. As a matter 
of fact, some people from [MBA’s] side would come and tell us, ‘We would provide you $7,000-$14,000 
under various heads and a group of women would come.’ They would not tell the purpose! They would 
not tell about why we are going! ‘Come to our meeting and join us. Let there be a gathering for the 
meeting.’ It is their sole purpose… They would be told, ‘Your group would get a scope of getting Rs.5 
lakh to 10 lakh. So come to our meeting and join it… If they would be told the truth, ‘Come children! 
Involve yourself in the Mahanadi movement’, then no one would go.” 
-Village resident, inland district 
 
“Prior to holding a rally, we are informed about that, ‘On such and such date a rally is going to be held. 
All of you must go. On such and such places we will meet’… We would not be able to know what kind of 
rally that would be! We don’t know! Then they will say that for such and such incidents the rally is going 
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to be held. Then we will go! What else? As we desperately need the water of the Mahanadi, for that 
reason we go.” 
-Village resident, inland district 
 
“The meeting was for the problems that we are facing for the scarcity of water. We are told [by MBA] to 
say, ‘All the mothers should say together that we are facing problems for the scarcity of water.’ They are 
saying like this!” 
-Village resident, inland district 
 
MBA also drew from WIO, utilizing narratives of ecological integrity and sustainability 
to enhance its claim of having ‘apolitical’ motivations: 
 
“Mahanadi issue pertaining to the dispute between two states – Odisha and Chhattisgarh – needs to be 
seen from a different perspective. Not just a kind of a conflict for sharing of water, rather it is a kind of 
you know the right of the river over its water and ecological, environmental, and e-flow of the river. 
Including the sustainability of the biodiversity around Mahanadi.” 
-Mahanadi Bachao Andolan leader, coastal district  
 
“This is the big challenge: stop Mahanadi and other rivers from the pollution. We can’t move - now this is 
the time. You can’t move Jharsuguda, you can’t move Sambalpur. There are huge pollution, you can’t 
believe.” 
-Mahanadi Bachao Andolan, coastal district 
 
Further adding to its reputation of disingenuity, MBA has been accused to appropriating 
its very name – Mahanadi Bachao Andolan – from the historic water activism work done in the 
Mahanadi basin by groups like Paschim Odisha: 
 
“So Mahanadi Bachao Andolan, actual Mahanadi Bachao Andolan was started in 2005/6 for you know 
protesting against water diversion to [industry]… So now, this name has been borrowed by these people. 
So when [government] took this position, it was really an opportune moment when Chhattisgarh – so it 
was kind of you know, what do you call it, an ideal time has come.” 
-NGO Employee, inland district 
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Discussion: Rendering ‘real’ work invisible 
 
How are intra-movement groups organized and how do they manage their legitimacy?  In 
the case of the Mahanadi River movement, groups operate in a factionalized context in which 
they must establish and maintain their legitimacy.  Doing so requires navigating spatially-
embedded power relations and deploying only those identities deemed to be legitimizing (e.g. 
livelihood stakes, ‘objective’ scientific expertise).  Those groups with fewer legitimizing 
qualities were found to tokenize other groups’ identities and experiences to bolster their own 
legitimacy.  Underlying these trends are assumptions about what constitutes ‘legitimate’ 
motivation and involvement.  The results of this study point to deeply-rooted notions of what is – 
and what is not – genuine or authentic.  Resulting hierarchies of legitimacy cast inland 
communities (represented by groups like Paschim Odisha) as ‘real’.  Groups like MBA tokenize 
‘real’ communities with the intent of achieving a similarly high legitimacy status, effectively 
masking the decades of work done by inland groups in the process.   
 
i.  Understanding ‘real’ movements 
 
In attempting to understand what is ‘real’, it is helpful to explore how the opposite (i.e. 
what is not ‘real’) is constituted.  Results from this case study reveal that MBA falls squarely 
within the latter category.  There are several potential factors contributing to this determination.  
MBA is (a) a new group (b) consisting of politicians and bureaucrats, which surreptitiously arose 
(c) immediately after the announcement of upstream dam construction and (d) before the 2019 
Legislative Assembly election.  Opportunistic timing aside, MBA’s interest in Mahanadi River 
resistance seems further disingenuous given the deeply-engrained notions of coastal elitism 
attached to this group.  The rise of this group, driven primarily by shifting external political 
context, is deemed insincere due to spatially-embedded impressions of group identity and 
motivation.   
 
The rise of MBA illustrates Larsen’s (2008) conceptualization of place as an exploitative 
political tool.  In tokenizing inland community members and their spaces, MBA is effectively 
using the tokens as tools to increase their own legitimacy.  However, in this case, place is used 
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not to construct a collective identity, but rather to bestow legitimacy upon the tokenizer.  Since 
place is tied closely to identity, such tokenization reinforces essentialist ideas of inland 
communities as vulnerable.  Further, MBA actions reflect Subasic et al.’s (2008) observation of 
high-status groups acting in political solidarity with low-status groups.  This particular case 
builds on Subasic et al.’s work in demonstrating how such ‘collaborations’ may in fact be 
concealing a more exploitative relationship.   
 
On the other hand, results clearly demonstrated that inland communities – represented by 
Paschim Odisha – constitute the ‘real’ Mahanadi River movement.  This group’s legitimacy is 
tied closely to its history of activism and its constituents’ high livelihood stakes, both of which 
are tied closely to space.  The results of this study expand on Woods’ (2003) ideas of group 
organizing based on place-based, intersectional identities by tying in selective identity 
deployment.  Given its position as the voice of inland, river-dependent communities, Paschim 
Odisha represents several highly-legitimate identities, rendering the group itself ‘real’.  
 
ii.  Rise of the disingenuous, subversion of the ‘real’ 
 
Though MBA is generally understood within the movement to be politically-motivated 
and thus insincere, it is nonetheless able to maintain its presence in the Mahanadi River 
movement by utilizing its resources and political clout to bolster its external legitimacy.  That is, 
because MBA is able to leverage its resources to draw tokens from inland communities, it is 
perceived by those external to the movement as a group ‘by the people and for the people’.  
These actions are made possible due to the complex, spatially-embedded power structures 
present in this factionalized context.  Specifically, MBA is able to successfully tokenize inland 
communities because purported offers of five lakh rupees – equivalent to approximately $7,000 – 
are impossible (or at least extraordinarily difficult) to refuse by Odia villagers who typically earn 
five to six US dollars per month.   
 
Because legitimacy is perceived based on external signals (Polletta and Kritschmer, 
2015), misrepresentations of Mahanadi River movement events may perpetuate MBA’s narrative 
of its stance as a group ‘by the people’.  For instance, media coverage of Mahanadi Bachao 
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Andolan events typically features photographs of protesters (see Fig. 9) without explaining who 
they are or how they came to participate in the event itself.   
 
 
Figure 9. Photographs from media reports of Mahanadi Bachao Andolan events (odishatv.in;orissadiary.com) 
 
This process of tokenization and misrepresentation restructures intra-movement 
understandings of legitimacy in a way that necessarily produces winners and losers.  In this case 
study, though inland communities (i.e. the tokenized) may become the face of the Mahanadi 
River movement, it is ultimately the interest of coastal groups (i.e. the tokenizers) being served.  
This case study parallels the example provided by Woods (2003) in which formal, nationally-
recognized, self-serving movement groups co-opted rural American interests, reshaping the 
trajectory of the movement as a whole.  In the case of the Mahanadi River movement, MBA has 
co-opted the legitimizing identities of inland communities to further its own alleged interests, 
subverting the work done by ‘real’ groups like Paschim Odisha in the process.  Figure 10 
outlines the process described here, starting with the tokenization of ‘real’ communities and the 
resulting reconstruction of intra-movement legitimacy, followed by the production of winners 
and losers.    
 
For groups like Paschim Odisha which are further spatially, socially, and politically 
detached from centers of power than their factional counterparts, protest is a critical political 
tool.  In many cases, protest may be the group’s only viable political recourse in the context of 
insecure water access.  By subverting the interests of ‘real’ groups, the process of tokenization 
and legitimacy reconstruction renders protest an ineffective tool for those groups who rely on it 
most (see Fig. 10).  The significance of these dynamics is compounded in the context of water 
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movements given the status of water as an essential resource.  In cases of water insecurity, 
groups who are tokenized and rendered invisible in large-scale water movements may face ‘life 
or death’ consequences based on movement outcomes (Bardhan, 1974).   
 
 
Figure 10. Tokenization, Legitimacy, and Protest as a Critical Political Tool 
 
Despite the context-specific complexities associated with this study, the implications of 
this work can – and should – be used to scrutinize broader socio-political movements (1) which 
claim to represent a broad range of interests and (2) in which power imbalances exist between 
groups.  As in the case of the Mahanadi River movement, these characteristics facilitate 
exploitation and perpetuate within-movement injustices, albeit in a more covert manner.  Thus, 
even when socio-political movements are deemed successful, the question remains: successful 
for whom?   
 
This work contributes a more nuanced view of environmental activism to the 
environmental justice and political ecology fields.  Environmental justice scholars and activists 
typically view ‘disadvantaged’ communities as homogenous groups protesting for equal access 
to environmental benefits and protection from environmental harms.  However, this study 
highlights the spatially-embedded, identity-based variation that exists in such movements and the 
dangerous implications of inattention to power imbalances through the organizing process.  
Disregard of such nuances may result in further disenfranchisement of society’s most 
disadvantaged groups.  Further, political ecologists have emphasized the ways in which conflicts 
over access to resources are embedded in politics, identity, and values.  This study incorporates 
the spatial dimension and demonstrates the ways in which these factors interact to re-produce 
understandings of legitimacy within the protest movement context.   
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Conclusion 
 
How are intra-movement groups organized and how do they manage their legitimacy?  
This study, grounded in literature on factionalism in socio-political movements and spatiality of 
power and protest, used the case of the Mahanadi River movement in Odisha, India to address 
these research questions.   
 
Results from four months of field work demonstrated that intra-movement groups are 
organized factionally and spatially.  Regarding the former, the Mahanadi River movement was 
split into three major factions, differentiated by stated and perceived motivations, place-based 
identity, and legitimacy.  Further, this case study highlighted the decades-long tenuous 
relationship between inland and coastal communities.  In this antagonistic and distrustful 
relationship, inland communities have been – and continue to be – exploited by coastal actors.  
These relations are embedded in the social and political fabric of Odisha state, resulting in place-
based, essentialist ideas of coastal elitism and inland simplicity and vulnerability.  Further, intra-
movement groups were found to manage their legitimacy using two related mechanisms: 
selective identity deployment and tokenism.  Movement groups – constituting and representing 
several intersectional social identities – emphasized only those identities deemed legitimizing by 
their factional counterparts.  Those areas in which a given group lacked legitimacy, groups were 
found to draw from (or tokenize) the identities and experiences of other, more legitimate groups.   
 
In discussing the construction of intra-movement legitimacy, I found that interviewees 
had established hierarchies of legitimacy in which some groups were considered ‘real’ and other 
groups the opposite.  In this paper’s discussion, I drew from the results, my field observations, 
and relevant literature to clarify understandings of ‘real’ movements, illustrate how tokenism for 
the sake of legitimacy masks the work done by ‘real’ groups, and how this process necessarily 
casts ‘real’ communities as ‘the loser’.   
 
This study builds on existing work on legitimacy in protest movements, yet there remain 
significant gaps in understanding.  In this study, movement factions are treated as groups with 
homogenous identities and interests.  However, there certainly exists variation in identity and 
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power within each group.  Future research may explore these within-group dynamics to 
determine how they may contribute to legitimacy and representation at the group or movement 
levels.  For instance, within-group power imbalances along gender, race, or class lines may affect 
the ways in which groups address issues of legitimacy and representation.  How might MBA’s 
legitimacy status have changed if the group’s leadership included non-politicians?  Does the 
work done by Paschim Odisha reflect the gendered effects of water insecurity?  Another 
direction for future research is to investigate the role of objectivity and authority in the 
construction of intra-movement legitimacy.  Though this was certainly a salient identity for the 
WIO group in this case study, the nature of the data collected precluded robust analysis into this 
question.  Does the legitimacy afforded to ‘objective’ groups with highly-educated leadership 
detract from the legitimacy – and thus protest power – of other groups? These dynamics are 
worth investigating further.   
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